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Lawyers are increasingly being called upon to defend municipalities in
suits brought by disgruntled developers, cable television operators and
other entrepreneurs who challenge, under the antitrust laws (and the Con-
stitution), municipal regulations and decisions that give a favorable
franchise to the plaintiff's competitor or otherwise fail to promote the
plaintiff's business aspirations.' Consequently, there has been much con-
cern over the question of antitrust immunity for municipalities.2
In Parker v. Brown,3 the Supreme Court held that a state is not pre-
cluded under the federal antitrust laws from imposing certain anticompeti-
tive restraints as a governmental act.4 The Court, however, has held that a
municipal government does not enjoy the immunity from antitrust claims
that applies to states under Parker unless it can show that its decision to
displace competition is "an act of government by the State as sovereign" or
is "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or mo-
nopoly public service."5 To qualify for this immunity a municipal program
must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" and
must also be "actively supervised by the State itself.' 6 In Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder,' the Court held that a home rule city
ordinarily cannot invoke the state's immunity for the very reason that the
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar and of the firm of Covington & Burling;
B.S.E., 1954, Princeton University; LL.B., 1961, Harvard University. The author is counsel
for a number of defendants in Richmond Hilton Associates v. City of Richmond, C.A. Nos.
81-1100-R and 81-1115-R, which is pending in the Eastern District of Virginia.
1. Criminal or government injunction cases are so unlikely as not to warrant separate
treatment.
2. See, e.g., Areeda, Antitrust Immunityfor "State Action"After Lafayette, 95 HARv. L.
REv. 435 (1981).
3. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
4. Id at 351-52.
5. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).
6. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410).
7. 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982).
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state has delegated to the city government the power to act as it sees best:
"A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be
said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which
municipal liability is sought."
This article outlines some of the considerations that may bear on the
question of antitrust liability once it is determined that no immunity can
be obtained. It focuses on the attitude of the Supreme Court, the purposes
of the antitrust laws, and the requirement of a conspiracy, including the
"bathtub" conspiracy doctrine and the Noerr doctrine, and concludes with
a brief discussion of abstention and of constitutional claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
What is the scope of antitrust liability of municipal government? Unfor-
tunately, there is no definite answer to this question, but the immunity
decisions and other cases spelling out the basic rationale of the antitrust
laws contain the basis for a response. Numerous decisions have also sug-
gested lines of defense that might prove fruitful. The cost to municipalities
of litigating pending and future cases, however, is likely to be substantial
before the key issues are finally settled, perhaps with the development of a
new "municipal rule of reason."
I. THE IMMUNITY DECISIONS
The immunity decisions hint at an answer to the question of the scope of
municipal antitrust liability. The voting and the language of the Supreme
Court in these cases indicate that the Court will not hasten to hold munici-
palities liable under the antitrust laws.
In City ofLafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. ,8 the Supreme Court
held, five to four, that municipally owned electric companies were not im-
mune from antitrust liability unless their actions were taken "pursuant to
state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public
service." 9 Vigorous dissents by Justice Stewart, joined by Justices White
and Rehnquist, and by Justice Blackmun, lamented the calamitous impact
of the holding on local governments. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
pointedly left open the question of the scope of liability: "It may be that
certain activities which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by
private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a local
government."'" And the Chief Justice, who supplied the fifth vote denying
antitrust immunity, did so only because the municipal activities at issue
8. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
9. Id at 413.
10. Id at 417 n.48.
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were "proprietary" and because the municipalities were simply engaged in
"an ordinary dispute among competitors in the same market.""
Justice Brennan's opinion for the five-to-three majority in Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,'2 repeated his language from La-
fayette in responding to the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist
(joined by Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice).' 3 Justice Stevens, con-
curring in the majority opinion, wrote separately for the sole purpose of
emphasizing that the issue of liability is distinct from immunity and might
well be decided differently. 14
It is thus fair to predict that at least the five current members of the
Court who did not fully endorse the Lafayette and Boulder holdings-the
Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor-
will be cautious in approving the imposition of liability upon local govern-
ments, particularly where they act in a "governmental" rather than in a
"proprietary" capacity. 5 Also, in view of Justice Brennan's twice stated
cautionary footnote and Justice Stevens' separate opinion in Boulder, the
remaining Justices who joined in Justice Brennan's opinions ruling against
immunity can be expected to tread just as cautiously when the liability
issue is squarely presented. 1
6
II. PURPOSES OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Similar indications can be drawn from opinions that have, over the
years, identified the main purposes of the antitrust laws. For example, the
Supreme Court has referred to the Sherman Act as relating to "business
competition"17 and as aimed at "combinations of business and capital or-
ganized to suppress commercial competition.""' The Court has been re-
luctant to apply the antitrust laws to the conduct of those who are not
1i. Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part).
12. 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (Justice White did not participate).
13. Id at 56 n.20.
14. Id. at 58 & n.l (quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976)).
15. This distinction seems out of step with modem tort concepts, see W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THlE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971), but the point cannot be ignored.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n.18 (1976) (contrasting an earlier
case applying a federal penal statute to a state-owned railroad with the Court's holding in
Usery that the Fair Labor Standards Act cannot, in view of the tenth amendment, be ap-
plied to state and local government employees).
16. Justice Rehnquist, however, observed in Boulder that once liability is established it
would "take a considerable feat of judicial gymnastics" to avoid the imposition of treble
damages if they would otherwise be appropriate. 455 U.S. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
17. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940).
18. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).
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engaged in commercial activities. The Sherman Act, the Court has said,
"is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is
applied to only a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions,
which normally have other objectives."' 9 Likewise, in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,20 although striking down a minimum-fee schedule established
by members of the bar, the Court pointed out that:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas.2 1
Lower court cases also show that when the defendants are not engaged
in normal commercial activities, conduct that is claimed to violate the anti-
trust laws will be scrutinized with special care under the rule of reason.
Thus, the film rating system developed by the movie producing industry
was challenged but upheld in Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pictures
Corp. ,22 and a similar result was reached in American Brands, Inc. v. Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters,23 when cigarette manufacturers unsuc-
cessfully challenged an agreement among broadcasters not to air cigarette
commercials. Amateur sports leagues and an organization that accredits
colleges have also been successful in defeating antitrust challenges to cer-
tain of their activities.24
It may be that these decisions have been undermined by National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States.25 There the Supreme Court
held that an engineer society's competitive bidding restraints, which alleg-
edly protected the public against shoddy and unsafe buildings, are subject
to Sherman Act challenge. The Court reasoned that this kind of protection
of the public was not a proper justification, where entrepreneurs stood to
benefit financially from the restraints they sought to impose.26
19. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).
20. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
21. Id at 788 n.17.
22. 319 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
23. 308 F. Supp. 1166 (D.D.C. 1969).
24. See, e.g., Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.
1977); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secon-
dary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Erie Buffalo
Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n of the United States, 438 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
25. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
26. Id at 696.
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Where, however, the restraints are closely supervised by public authori-
ties, unlike the restraints struck down in Cantor, Goldfarb, and Professional
Engineers, there is less need to employ the antitrust laws or to be con-
cerned about power residing in the wrong hands. Surely, a governmental
decision that competitive bidding by engineers should not be permitted
because it could lead to shoddy and unsafe buildings does not raise the
concerns that produced the result in Professional Engineers.
The relevance of this line of reasoning to municipal antitrust liability is
obvious. A decision by a municipal government to displace competition in
pursuit of some other public purpose seems to lack certain essential quali-
ties of the type of conduct that normally falls under the ban of the Sher-
man Act.27
The facts of Boulder provide a good example. The plaintiff held a
twenty-year nonexclusive franchise, granted by the city, to build and oper-
ate a cable television business. The firm had confined its operations to an
area of the city that, because of terrain, did not enjoy good off-the-air tele-
vision service. Technological advances, however, made it possible for the
firm to offer more than just clearer reception from nearby television sta-
tions, and in 1979 it announced its intent to expand into other areas. The
city council foresaw that the same technological developments might stim-
ulate the market entry of other firms, but it feared that the plaintiff would
have too much of an edge as a result of its franchise. It enacted a three-
month moratorium on further expansion while it studied a new cable pol-
icy that would attract new entrants, and thus more competition, in the pro-
vision of a new service to residents of the city. 28
Had such a step been taken by a manufacturer-forbidding branching
by its distributor in order to encourage more competition in the distribu-
tion of its products, for example--one could argue that such a competi-
tion-influencing decision is unlawful when made by private interests.
According to this argument, the marketplace should govern that decision
and should allow the distributor who was, for whatever reason, better posi-
tioned to benefit from new developments to reap the rewards of that cir-
cumstance. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,29 the Supreme
Court relied on this argument and held that such decisions are per se viola-
tions of the antitrust laws. Now, however, the competitive pros and cons
must be balanced under the rule of reason. Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE
27. There may also be difficulties in finding the requisite effect on interstate commerce,
a prerequisite to antitrust liability under federal law. See, e.g., Kendrick v. City Council of
Augusta, 516 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
28. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 44-46.
29. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
Sylvania, Inc. 30 overruled the Schwinn per se rule, but the arguments must
still be evaluated under traditional antitrust concepts.3 '
Do such arguments apply, however, when a publicly accountable mu-
nicipal agency makes the decision? In such a case, the public, not private
interests, elects to freeze entrepreneurial development while the situation is
being sorted out. Although potential new entrants may well benefit from
such action, it is not they who have instituted the freeze. A federal judge is
not called upon to weigh ab initio the pros and cons of a private decision.
Instead, he or she is asked to oversee a decision already made by a public
body that has the duty and responsibility to consider the public interest. 2
It is unlikely the 1890 Congress that enacted the Sherman Act intended it
be used as a vehicle for federal courts to review a broad range of municipal
decisions, even where municipalities do not enjoy immunity from the
Act.3
3
Justice Brennan may have had such an analysis in mind when he sug-
gested, in both Lafayette and Boulder, that liability does not necessarily
follow from lack of immunity.34 In Boulder, he sought to buttress this sug-
gestion with a "compare. . . with" citation of Professional Engineers and
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland."5 In some respects, the Exxon case
is a bit off the point. That case involved a challenge to a Maryland state
law that, inter alia, required oil companies that gave gasoline service sta-
tions "voluntary allowances" to make them available to all stations in the
state.3 6 The law was challenged on the basis that it was inconsistent with
section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act,37 which allows a firm accused of
price discrimination to defend on the ground that a lower price was neces-
sary to meet an equally low price offered by a competitor.3 The Supreme
Court rejected the challenge, reasoning that section 2(b) only permitted,
and did not require, sellers to discriminate when the prescribed condition
30. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
31. Id at 57.
32. See generaly Posner, The Proper Relationshp Between State Regulation and the Fed-
eralAntitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 705 (1974) (cited by Justice Brenuan in Lafay-
ette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48).
33. Cf. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
34. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 417 n.48; Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56-57 & n.20.
35. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51 n.20 (comparing Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)).
36. 437 U.S. at 119-20. The law, upheld by the Supreme Court, also forbade the owner-
ship of service stations in the state by oil companies. Justice Brennan, however, did not
address this aspect of the case.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
38. Id
[Vol. 32:395
Litigation Strategies After Boulder
existed.39 Thus, there was no fundamental inconsistency between state
and federal law.' ° Moreover, the challenged law was state law, not a mu-
nicipal ordinance. Nevertheless, Professional Engineers can be read to say
that a net anticompetitive effect is enough to strike down a practice, while
Justice Brennan, in Boulder, summarized the Exxon holding this way:
"anticompetitive effect is an insufficient basis for invalidating a state
law."" Thus, Exxon's application to a case challenging municipal action
that eliminates competition needs to be considered.
III. CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE IN GENERAL
In addition to examining the purposes of the antitrust laws, it may also
be useful to consider a critical element of a typical Sherman Act case-the
plaintiffs need to prove a "contract, combination or conspiracy."42 Here,
the plaintiffs case may meet the "bathtub" conspiracy obstacle.
The "bathtub" concept questions whether some "persons" are legally
capable of conspiring with one another. Thus a corporation and its officers
cannot be guilty of a conspiracy if the officers are acting in their capacity
as officers. A corporation can act only through its officers and employees.
To allow a conspiracy claim in such a case would leave little freedom to
corporations, acting unilaterally, to pursue their business objectives.43
Applying this concept to municipal governments, it seems likely that
plaintiffs who are attempting to prove conspiracy will have to find defen-
dants who are not government officials or agencies to place them within
section 1 (and the conspiracy to monopolize aspect of section 2)." Because
a municipal government can act only through such persons and agencies,
finding a conspiracy based solely on municipal action would seem to run
afoul of the "bathtub" doctrine. Government officials and agencies are
supposed to work together, not compete. It would therefore be difficult to
justify a holding that such joint action, even if it produced an anticompeti-
tive result, is an unlawful conspiracy. Yet numerous antitrust cases against
municipal governments seem to be predicated on just such a notion.4"
39. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 131-32.
40. Id
41. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). [Hereinafter the word "conspiracy" is used as a shorthand for
these terms].
43. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
44. This article does not discuss the monopolization and attempt to monopolize aspects
of § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). A municipality rarely has or wants a monopoly in the line of
commerce the plaintiff would be complaining about.
45. See, e.g., Glenwillow Landfill, Inc. v. City of Akron, 485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ohio
1979), aft'dsub nom Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981),
19831
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To meet this problem, plaintiffs sometimes allege that the beneficiary of
the allegedly anticompetitive activity is part of the conspiracy. Even in a
case of this kind there are difficulties in proving a Sherman Act conspiracy.
In Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. City of Pensacola,46 the city had solicited
bids for car rental concessions at the municipal airport. It planned to
award concessions to the four highest bidders. Five firms entered bids.
Dollar Rent-A-Car entered the lowest bid, but it claimed that Grey-
hound's bid did not meet specifications requiring, inter alia, five years ex-
perience on a national scale; Greyhound had offices in only seven states.
The city council considered the advice of Dollar's counsel that this specifi-
cation posed no antitrust problem but worried that it might be exposed to
liability claims. Dollar then accepted the city attorney's request that the
company indemnify the city if it were sued for rejection of Greyhound's
bid-a set of facts an antitrust plaintiff is happy to learn about. The coun-
cil gave Dollar the fourth slot and Greyhound sued under section 1, alleg-
ing a conspiracy between the city and Dollar. The jury found for the
defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed.4 7 The critical question was
the conspiracy allegation. There was no evidence that Dollar had induced
the city to adopt the specification that led to Greyhound's disqualification.
Also, the jury and the court of appeals accepted the city's contention that
the city council did not know about the indemnity and hence that it was
not a quid pro quo for the decision to disqualify Greyhound. An antitrust
lawyer might be forgiven for concluding that this case might well have
come out differently if purely private defendants had been involved. But
maybe a municipal government is different--enough so to produce a dif-
ferent result.48
A different problem was presented in Mason City Center Associates v.
City of Mason City.49 The plaintiffs brought suit on a municipal decision
denying their request for rezoning of a tract of land on the edge of town.
The city had contracted with two private developers to carry out its plan to
promote development of its downtown area. The contract contained a
statement affirming the city's "policy to discourage any development con-
trary to the stated objectives" of the downtown development plan-again a
vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982). The lower courts both found immunity, al-
though not on the same grounds, and never reached the question of whether an unlawful
conspiracy had been properly pleaded. After Boulder, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Sixth Circuit for further consideration.
46. 676 F.2d 1380 (11 th Cir. 1982).
47. Id
48. See also Kendrick v. City Council of Augusta, 516 F. Supp. 1134, 1141 (S.D. Ga.
1981).
49. 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
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set of facts bound to make an antitrust plaintiff happy.5" The plaintiffs
claimed that their rezoning application was denied because of this commit-
ment and they sued the city, members of the city council, and the two
developers for treble damages. The city council members were permitted
to testify that they were motivated, not by the commitment, but by "their
views on the propriety of downtown as opposed to suburban development,
and because of their desire to adhere to the previously adopted compre-
hensive plan."'" This testimony apparently was accepted by the jury,
which found against the plaintiffs, and the court of appeals affirmed on the
theory that the agreement with the developers was not the cause of plain-
tiffs' injury.52
It is not at all clear that purely private defendants could ever defeat a
Sherman Act claim with such self-serving testimony, or that a court even
would allow the jury to hear it. But the Mason City court apparently be-
lieved that a municipal government is somehow different, in antitrust
terms, from a private defendant. In any event, Mason City certainly will
be cited in favor of allowing a defense based upon proper public purpose
where a municipal government is sued, even if private parties are also sued
as coconspirators.
IV. OUTSIDE CONSULTANTS OR AGENTS
A variant of the conspiracy issue arises when a private defendant is a
consultant to a municipal government or is the vehicle by which the alleg-
edly anticompetitive activity is carried out. Let us suppose that a city is
considering, as was Akron, Ohio, how to handle waste disposal and, simul-
taneously, how to develop new sources of energy for downtown businesses.
Let us suppose further that a consultant has advised the city that the best
solution would be a city-owned recycling plant, operated by a private
party under contract, that would convert solid waste to steam or electricity,
and that such a plant would not be economically feasible unless all solid
wastes collected in the city were processed through the plant.53 If private
waste disposal firms sued under the antitrust laws, could the consultant or
the plant operator be joined as defendants and thus supply the necessary
conspiracy element?54
One difficulty facing a plaintiff in such a situation is the general rule-a
50. Id at 1148.
51. Id at 1149.
52. Id. at 1150.
53. Cf City ofAkron, 485 F. Supp. at 674, 687-89.
54. The plaintiffs in City of Akron sued only municipal and state defendants so the
question was not presented there.
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variant of the "bathtub" doctrine--that a principal and its agent cannot be
guilty of conspiracy, at least if the agent did not participate knowingly in
the challenged conduct with an intent to bring about the anticompetitive
result. Understanding this rule requires discussion of Albrecht v. Herald
Co.,"s and some of the lower court cases that have construed it.
In Albrecht, a newspaper publisher urged a distributor to discontinue
selling newspapers at prices higher than those the publisher had suggested.
When the distributor refused, the publisher told the distributor that it
would begin offering the newspapers directly to the distributor's customers
at the suggested price. The publisher also retained Milne Circulations
Sales, Inc., to conduct direct solicitation of the distributor's customers.
Milne "was aware that the aim of the solicitation campaign was to force
[the distributor] to lower his price." '56 The publisher then turned over the
successfully solicited customers to Kroner, who understood that he would
have to charge the suggested price and that, if the distributor began com-
plying with the publisher's demands, he might have to return the custom-
ers to the distributor. The Supreme Court held that the conspiracy
requirement of section 1 was satisfied by these facts.5 7
Albrecht formed the basis for an Eighth Circuit decision finding an un-
lawful conspiracy between an airline and its advertising agency. In Inter-
national Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc. ,58 the plaintiff
arranged travel group charters, a business that can provide substantial
competition to scheduled airlines. Western had observed advertising for
such charters on the west coast (not by the plaintiff) and asked its advertis-
ing agency to formulate a response. It found that the agency already had
begun working on such a program. Ads developed by the agency proved
to be effective in limiting the charters' competitive threat. When the plain-
tiff began offering similar charter flights from the Twin Cities to Hawaii,
Western, which had a monopoly on that route, began a campaign to pre-
vent the plaintiff from gaining a foothold. A key component of the cam-
paign was the advertising agency's placement of newspaper and radio ads,
similar to those used on the west coast, in the Twin Cities area. The ads
were found to be false, misleading and deceptive in a number of respects.5 9
The court of appeals, after a bench trial, upheld the district court's findings
that the campaign was an unreasonable restraint of trade and that Western
and its advertising agency were coconspirators within the meaning of sec-
55. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
56. Id at 150.
57. 1d at 153.
58. 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980).
59. 623 F.2d at 1264.
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tion ,1 of the Sherman Act." Critical to this result was the finding that the
agency had participated in the campaign-indeed, it had actually carried
out a key part of it-with knowledge that the purpose was to prevent the
charter firms from becoming a competitive threat.
Other cases have followed a different approach and have not found a
conspiracy. For example, in Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co. ,6 the Third Cir-
cuit read Albrecht as requiring a finding of three factors in instances where
a plaintiff alleges that the principal actor has conspired with a lesser party:
(1) the lesser party must know of the principal actor's purpose to restrain
trade; (2) both participants must stand to benefit from the restraint and
thus share in the purpose to restrain trade; and (3) the agreement with the
lesser party must itself restrain trade rather than being merely collateral.62
Because not all of these factors were present in Friedman, the court found
no liability.63
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Fuchs Sugars & Syr-
ups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp. 64 Amstar, the defendant, had been marketing its
sugar through independent brokers but decided to change its system and
market exclusively through brokers that handled only its products. It can-
celled all of its brokerage arrangements and entered into new exclusive
arrangements with two of its former independent brokers. Two of the ter-
minated brokers sued Amstar and the new brokers, claiming a conspiracy
among them. The plaintiffs were denied relief because the new brokers
had not knowingly and actively participated in Amstar's allegedly unlaw-
ful scheme to bring about an anticompetitive result.65 The court also ex-
plained that a broker is not independent, and therefore cannot be a
coconspirator, where it merely acts as a means to bring in customers while
the principal decides on the price and other conditions of a sale.66
Thus, liability seems to turn on the outsider's degree of involvement and
knowledge of the purpose of the activity in which it participates. Merely
supplying information and advice to the principal defendant--the normal
function of a consultant-would seem an insufficient basis for holding the
60. Id at 1266-68.
61. 581 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1978).
62. Id at 1073.
63. Id See also Kreizer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 516 F. Supp. 1034,
1037-40 (D.D.C. 1981).
64. 602 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979).
65. 602 F.2d at 1032-33.
66. Id at 1031 n.5. See also Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp.,
638 F.2d 1061, 1075 (7th Cir. 1981).
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consultant as a coconspirator.67 Likewise, carrying out the directions of the
principal defendant should not be enough where there is no participation
in formulating the anticompetitive scheme.6" Indeed, it has been suggested
that the outsider can be held as a coconspirator only if its very agreement
with the principal eliminates a competitive force or otherwise restrains
trade.69
V. THE NOERR DOCTRINE
A point that might have been raised in the Greyhound case is that the
antitrust laws do not apply at all where a private party seeks legislative
action, even if it is designed to injure a competitor. This is the so-called
Noerr doctrine.
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. ,7o
the Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws do not apply to a firm's
genuine efforts to influence legislation even though the legislation would
give the firm a competitive edge, the firm plainly sought the result, and the
campaign includes unfair and illegal tactics, including an effort to destroy
the good will of the firm's competitors." The Court said that the antitrust
laws are not aimed at political activities, nor are they designed to establish
a code of ethics for political behavior."' The first amendment implications
of such an effort to regulate political behavior played a central role in the
decision." In United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Pennington," the Court
expanded Noerr and applied it to efforts to influence administrative action,
and in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,75 the doc-
trine was held applicable to litigation. For the Noerr doctrine to apply, the
undertakings must be genuine and untainted by fraud and they must not
be "sham," i.e., not in fact aimed at denying the competitor access to the
67. See, e.g., Virginia Academy v. Blue Shield, 469 F. Supp. 552, 559 (E.D. Va. 1979),
atf'd, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980).
68. See, e.g., National Tire Wholesale, Inc. v. Washington Post Co., 441 F. Supp. 81, 87
(D.D.C. 1977), ayfd, 595 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Austin v. House of Vision, Inc., 404 F.2d
401 (7th Cir. 1969).
69. Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section 1 fthe Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REV.
661, 679 (1982). See also Harrington, The Bathtub Overifows." Conspiracy With Advertising
Agents, Management Consultants, Commission Brokers and Other "Outside"Agencies Under
Section 1 ofthe Sherman Act, 22 ANTrrRUST BULL. 741 (1977).
70. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
71. Id
72. Id at 135-36.
73, Id at 137-38.
74. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
75. 404 U.S. 508 (1971).
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governmental process. 6
Noerr has been applied at the municipal level numerous times. In Mark
Aero, Inc. v. Trans WorldAirlines, Inc.," the plaintiff had been unsuccess-
ful in its efforts to persuade Kansas City authorities to reopen the in-town
municipal airport for a new passenger service to St. Louis. The city was
concerned, among other things, about the economic impact such an act
would have on the large, handsome international airport, also owned by
the city but located eighteen miles from downtown. The unsuccessful en-
trepreneur sued, not the city, but two major airlines, alleging that they had
conspired to block the plaintiff from gaining access to the market for air
carrier service between Kansas City and St. Louis. Its allegations, how-
ever, addressed the airlines' efforts to induce (and even to "coerce") the
city to deny the plaintiff's request.7 The court of appeals held that Noerr
provided a defense. 9 Indeed, the court's opinion contains strong indica-
tions of hostility toward the use of antitrust suits as a means for reviewing
political decisions by municipal governments. The court stated that the
matter was a "governmental problem, to be solved by the electorate
through its proper officials." The court saw no need for its intervention
based on the antitrust statutes.80 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
the question of whether to open a competing airport was a policy question
in the realm of city government, involving such issues as "risks to the new
airport, risks as to airport financing and a shift in airport activity." The
resolution of such questions, the court said, "is a matter of city
government.s
An aspect of the Noerr issue that is not altogether clear is whether nam-
ing the municipal government itself or any municipal officials as defen-
dants produces a different result. Pennington noted that the government
action the defendants had allegedly conspired to procure "was the act of a
public official who is not claimed to be a coconspirator,"8 2 thus implying
that naming the official as a coconspirator might produce a different result.
76. Id at 511; see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
77. 580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978).
78. Id at 292.
79. Id at 294-95.
80. Id at 289-90.
81. Id at 292. Other cases applying the Noerr doctrine to municipal governments are
Miracle Mile Assocs. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980); Metro Cable Co. v.
CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975); Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of
Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982); and other cases cited in In re Airport Car
Rental Antitrust Litig., 521 F. Supp. 568, 585 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
82. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671.
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In Metro Cable Co. v. CA TVofRockford, Inc. ,83 the Seventh Circuit did
not think that naming an official warranted a different result. However,
another Seventh Circuit decision and cases in other courts suggest
otherwise.8
4
The plaintiff in Metro Cable had unsuccessfully bid for a cable televi-
sion franchise in Rockford, Illinois. It sued the successful cable operator
and related parties, as well as the mayor and the leading alderman. The
district court dismissed under Noerr,85 and the court of appeals affirmed.86
Although it was alleged that the mayor and alderman were persuaded to
vote for the private defendants in exchange for "substantial" campaign
contributions, 7 the court said that such allegations do not change the re-
sult: A key point of Noerr is that the Sherman Act is not aimed at regulat-
ing political behavior, and the fact that the effort to induce legislative
action was effective--which necessarily would involve favorable votes by
some legislators--cannot take the case out of the Noerr doctrine.8 8 A simi-
lar result was reached in Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal
Co. ,9 which the Metro Cable court cited.9
Within months of Metro Cable, the Third Circuit reached the opposite
result on similar facts in Duke & Co. v. Foerster.9" That case involved
allegations that the plaintiff had been precluded from selling its malt bev-
erages at Pittsburgh's Three Rivers Stadium and other public arenas.
Among the defendants were three municipal corporations and a county
commissioner sued in both his official and individual capacities. The dis-
trict court dismissed on the basis of Noerr (and Parker v. Brown) but the
court of appeals reversed. The court said that the Noerr doctrine protects
a government agency that acts favorably on a request for an anticompeti-
tive act if the agency acts within its legal power and in what it considers to
be the public interest.92 Where the complaint alleges "official participa-
tion" by the agency in a scheme to restrain trade, however, the result is
different.93 The court did not cite Metro Cable, nor did it cite the Ninth
Circuit's Sun Valley decision. Instead, it cited an earlier Ninth Circuit
83. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
84. See infra notes 91, 96 and accompanying text.
85. 375 F. Supp. 350, 357-58 (N.D. II. 1974).
86. 516 F.2d at 222.
87. Id at 223.
88. Id at 230.
89. 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
90. 516 F.2d at 229.
91. 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975).
92. Id at 1282.
93. Id
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case, Harman v. Valley National Bank,94 although Sun Valley had indi-
cated that Harman was no longer good law.95
In Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District,96 a different Seventh Cir-
cuit panel held that Noerr does not protect government officials who
knowingly receive a "sham" bid and use it to coerce another bidder. The
court reasoned that Noerr was based on the "essential dissimilarity" be-
tween improper political activity and the type of conduct proscribed by the
antitrust laws and on the need to maintain an open flow of information to
the government. 97 The court concluded that neither rationale was perti-
nent to the case before it.98
In Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Associa-
tion , the plaintiff challenged a campaign by the defendants to keep its
mail-order prescription drugs off the market. After a bench trial, the court
found that the Iowa Board of Pharmacy had been actively involved in the
campaign and held that Noerr did not protect the Board.'I
Discerning a single set of principles from these disparate holdings is not
easy. The facts are very important, so the various reasons that led to the
Noerr decision and its progeny must be examined and analyzed in the
context of a particular case. Nevertheless, the Noerr doctrine may provide
a defense in many types of municipal antitrust liability cases.
VI. ABSTENTION
By definition, suits that threaten cities with antitrust liability tend to in-
volve questions of state law. For example, where a municipal government
has decided to award someone an exclusive cable television franchise or to
deny an application to rezone a tract of land, state law usually provides the
municipal government with the underlying authority to act. In such cases,
another obstacle that might confront plaintiffs is the doctrine of abstention,
although the result might be only a suspension of proceedings rather than
termination of the case.
Three different rationales have been developed for a federal court to
abstain from deciding a case that is properly before it. They bear the
94. 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
95. Sun Valley, 420 F.2d at 342-43. See also Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Hous-
ton, 519 F. Supp. 991, 1021 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
96. 557 F.2d 580, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978) (in
light of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389 (1978)), reinstated per curiam, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979).
97. Id at 592 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-37).
98. Id
99. 484 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1980).
100. Id at 1207-09.
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names of the Supreme Court decisions that gave them birth: Pullman, Bur-
ford, and Younger.
In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. the Court held that a federal
court should abstain when the case involves an unsettled question of state
law the resolution of which could affect an issue of federal constitutional
law raised in the case, either by making it unnecessary to decide the consti-
tutional question or by changing the setting in which that question is to be
decided.'o 2 Such issues will not often be presented in an antitrust case, but
they may be raised where a claim is also made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.103
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co. , the Court held that federal courts should
abstain from deciding difficult questions of state law that involve impor-
tant state policies or administrative concerns. 0 5 For example, a state's
land use policies might not sufficiently direct anticompetitive conduct by
municipalities to warrant immunity under Parker v. Brown, yet a decision
on the merits of a federal antitrust claim might well affect the manner in
which the state's land use policies are to be carried out. In such a case,
abstention may be appropriate."° Where the federal claim does not chal-
lenge land use decisions on their merits, but on the ground that they were
fraudulently made, however, abstention under Burford is inappropriate. ' 0 7
Finally, in Younger v. Harris,"I the Court held abstention appropriate if
resolution of the federal claim would require an injunction against a pend-
ing state criminal proceeding.109 A number of decisions have broadened
the doctrine to cover quasi-criminal situations that would involve federal
courts' interference with state court proceedings, thus raising problems of
federal-state relations similar to those that lead to the Younger decision.' 1 0
In an antitrust case involving a local redevelopment plan alleged to have
been a "sham," the district court abstained because the relief sought by the
plaintiff would have interfered with a condemnation case filed in a state
101. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
102. Id at 501.
103. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
104. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
105. Id at 317-18.
106. See Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 666 F.2d 1029, 1034 (6th Cir.
1981). Cf. Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 464 (D. Md. 1978) (action
challenging land use decisions of a local government under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the
court abstained, noting that a district court is not a "state-wide Court of Zoning Appeals.").
107. Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 2270 (1982).
108. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
109. Id at 53-54.
110. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
[Vol. 32:395
Litigation Strategies After Boulder
court after the federal case had been filed."11
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Finally, a brief word should be said about constitutional challenges to
municipal decisions, since these are frequently joined with antitrust claims.
The statutory basis for such challenges is typically 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one of
the laws enacted following the conclusion of the Civil War." 2
The volume of litigation under this section has been enormous. ' 3 As
might be expected, the typical case involves a civil rights issue in the ordi-
nary sense of that term-race discrimination, arrests without probable
cause, other police misconduct and the like. It is difficult to apply the prin-
ciples developed in the typical cases to the less frequent and quite different
use of section 1983 in cases brought by unsuccessful entrepreneurs who
question government decisions having nothing to do with traditional civil
rights concerns. A few general points are, however, noteworthy.
First, a municipal corporation can be liable for a section 1983 viola-
tion."14 However, it may not be sued under a respondeat superior theory
"for injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents."' '5 The corporation
may be held liable only when the acts complained of constitute "execution
of a government's policy or custom."' 6
Second, although governmental officials may be sued, some enjoy abso-
lute immunity."I7 Other officials enjoy a qualified immunity. Specifically,
111. Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. I11. 1981).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The section states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
113. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1133, 1136 n.7 (1977).
114. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruling, Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
115. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
116. Id
117. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982) (the President); Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (legislators); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (administrative officials who perform functions analogous to
those of judges and prosecutors); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors). This immunity also applies to municipal
officials acting in a legislative capacity. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607
(8th Cir. 1980).
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in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,I" the Supreme Court held that "government offi-
cials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liabil-
ity for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."" l9
Because Harlow is so recent, it is worth observing that it overruled a line
of cases that also had made officials liable if they acted with malice. 20 The
Court in Harlow was persuaded that allegations of malice are too easily
made and are difficult to defeat without a full trial, thus undercutting one
of the purposes of qualified immunity-to spare officials the burdens of
discovery and trial and thus minimize the disruption to effective govern-
ment such cases can cause.' 21 Thus, it should be rare indeed for a city
official to be held liable for damages in a suit claiming, for example, that
his or her decision not to approve a building permit was unlawful because
it violated some yet-to-be-decided principle of constitutional law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When the law is new and still developing, it requires more courage and
foresight than this author possesses to make predictions about where it is
heading. The circumstances under which municipalities and their officials
will be held liable for antitrust violations, or for violations of section 1983
in connection with noncivil rights actions, are not capable of prediction.
What can be predicted with confidence, however, is that local governments
will spend many dollars for litigation and suffer considerable disruption
and uncertainty as court struggle to find the answers to these questions in
the course of developing a "municipal rule of reason."
118. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
119. Id at 2738.
120. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
121. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2738.
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